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Altizer: Minimizing Federal Income Taxes upon the Sale of Corporate Assets

MINIMIZING FEDERAL INCOME TAXES UPON THE
SALE OF CORPORATE ASSETS

By JACKSON D. ALT=ZEa0
The proverb that this or that prospective event is "as certain as death and taxes" is of special significance in an era
marked by desperate attempts to balance state and national budgets. But for the same taxing power to levy a double tax of
the same kind upon the same property, or in the case of the income tax upon what is essentially the, same profit, is a burden
which the average taxpayer does not expect, and, with a degree
of justification, heartily resents when he finds himself the victim.' Nevertheless, when a corporation markets its assets at a
profit, liquidates and dissolves, the Treasury, under existing laws,
assesses against what is actually the same gain two distinct taxes
since on strict analysis two taxable transactions are involved. The
first is the disposition by the corporation of its assets, whereupon
a tax accrues against it on the resultant profit2 measured by the
difference between the cost or other basis to it of the assets sold
and the amount received therefor.' The second is the distribution of the proceeds of the sale to the stockholders in liquidation,
causing a tax to become payable by each stockholder on his individual profit' represented by the difference between the cost or
other basis to him of his stock and the amount of his liquidating
dividend.' The corporation tax is fixed under the present statute
at 13-3/4% of the net profit." The tax which will be assessed
against each stockholder depends upon the amount of his net income for the year or years in which the liquidating dividend is
received, or, in other words, the rate of surtax which he must
pay.' Taken together there is imposed upon the profit arising from
* Member of the Bar, Charleston, West Virginia.
'When congress has clearly expressed its intention the statute must be
sustained even though double taxation results. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276
U. S. 233, 48 S. Ct. 244 (1928). Double taxation is not prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253
U. S. 325, 330, 40 S. Ct. 558 (1920); Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 22
S. Ct. 493 (1902).
2 REvEaNuE ACT Op 1932, § 22 (a).
'Id. §§ 111 and 113.

'Id. § 115 (c).

5Supra n. 2.
. REvm.uE ACT op 1932, § 13 (a). However, if the corporation is affiliated
with another corporation or corporations and a consolidated return is Ilhed,
the rate of tax for the years 1932 and 1933 is 14:%. Id. § 141 (c).
Yid.

§ 12.
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such transaction a rate of tax which is only equaled by the surtax rates applicable to large individual incomes.8
To illustrate, let us suppose that the X corporation is organized in the year 1923 with an authorized and issued capital stock
The
of $100,000.00 which is fully paid in by the stockholders.
year
the
in
which,
assets
purchase
to
is
used
acquired
thus
capital
1933, have so greatly increased in value that an opportunity is
The
presented to dispose of them for the sum of $700,000.00.
$200,000.00.
residual cost of the assets plus capital additions equals
If this sale is consummated by the corporation, a profit of $500,000.00 will be realized upon which a tax of $68,750.00 will be
payable by the corporation. In addition, the stockholders will be
liable for a tax on the difference between the cost of their stock
($100,000.00) and the amount distributed to them in liquidation.
The corporation tax is, of course, deductible in arriving at the
liquidating profit,' and supposing that expenses incident to the
sale amount to $31,250.00, the net proceeds for distribution will
he $600,000.00, of which $500,000.00 is profit to the stockholders
and taxable not as a dividend paid by a going-concern, but at
both the normal and surtax rates,0 or in the case of stockholders
who have held their stock over two years, at the special capital
In other words, the actual beneficial
net gain rate of 12 2'.
owners of the assets thus disposed of are doubly taxed on the resultant profit as a penalty for conducting business under the corporate form, and if the transaction can be effected by a method
which will legally avoid the corporate tax, there is a net saving
to the stockholders of the difference between such tax and its
value as a deduction in arriving at net proceeds from distribution, .depending upon the rates of tax to which the individuals
will be subjected, or which they may claim under the capital net
gain provisions of the Act. In the supposed case if the original
stockholders have remained unchanged they may, if they so desire, avail themselves of the 12 % rate, and consequently, in
8

Even if the stockholders are in a position to take advantage of the capital net gain provisions of the Act, the total tax rate is 26 % which is
equivalent to the current surtax rates on net incomes of between $56,000.00
and $58,000.00.
0Under REVENUE AcT OF 1932, § 23 (c), the corporation tax is not deductible in computing its net profit but the amount thereof will be subtracted in arriving at the net liquidating dividend.
10The conflict between the Sixth and Eighth Circuits on this point has
been definitely put to rest. Hellmich v. Hellman, supra n. 1.
REvsKuu ACT OF 1932, § 101.
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the even the corporate tax can be avoided, they will save approximately $60,000.00.
The right to conduct business transactions in a manner designed to keep taxes at a minimum, providing full disclosure is
made to the representatives of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, cannot now be questioned.
A distinction is made by
the courts between tax evasion, which implies concealment and is
illegal, and tax avoidance, an open assertion of rights which is
not only lawful but commanded by the dictates of good judgment
where such a course is made possible by the circumstances, and
does not involve sacrifices which outweigh the benefits which ensue. "We do not speak of evasion", said Mr. Justice Holmes
in Bullen v. Wisconsin,' "because, when the law draws a line,
a case is on one side or the other, and if on the safe side is none
the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of
what the law permits." And as the Board of Tax Appeals has
said in a recent case: "A corporation may clearly do what it
has a legal right to do even for the sole purpose of reducing its
tax liability. It is not required to pursue a course which gives rise
to a greater tax liability if another course is open to it which will
give rise to a less tax liability."' These remarks are particularly apt where a heavy federal tax, imposed on the privilege of
doing business as a corporation at the very moment when the
privilege is, in effect, surrendered, may be avoided.1'
It is proposed, therefore, to discuss briefly the question of
to what extent, if any, the tax burden incident to profitable corporate liquidation may be lessened and further, to consider possible methods of liquidation which may result in keeping taxes at
the minimum provided for by law.
- 240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473 (1915).
1 Fruit Belt Telephone Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 440 (1931).
"In United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506, 21 L. ed. 728 (1873) the
Supreme Court said: "it is said that the transaction proved upon the trial
in this case, is a device to avoid the payment of a stamp duty, and that its
operation is that of a fraud upon the revenue. This may be true, and if

not true in fact in this case, it may well be true in other instances. To this
objection there are two answers: 1st. That if the device is carried out by
the means of legal forms, it is subject to no legal censure. To illustrate:
The Stamp Act of 1862 imposed a duty of two cents upon a bank-check,
when drawn for an amount not less than twenty dollars. A careful individual, having the amount of twenty dollars to pay, pays the same by
handing to his creditor two checks of ten dollars each.
He thus draws
checks in payment of his debt to the amount of twenty dollars, and yet pays
no stamp duty. This practice and this system he pursues habitually n4I
persistently. While his operations deprive the government of the duties it
might reasonably expect to receive, it is not perceived that the practice ii
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Under no circumstances can the tax to the respective stockholders on their liquidating dividends to the extent that these
dividends exceed the cost or other basis of the stock be avoided,
nor should it be, since the stockholders will, presumably, receive
open to the charge of fraud. He resorts to devices to avoid the payment of
duties, but they are not illegal.
He has the legal right to split up his
evidences of payment, and thus to avoid the tax. The device we are considering is of the same nature." See also Weeks v. Sibley, 269 Fed. 155
(N. D. Tex. 1920); Fraser v. Nauts, 8 F. (2d) 106 (N. D. Ohio 1925);
Andrus v. Burnet, Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 332 (App. D. 0. 1931); Appeal
of Robert Jemison, Jr., 3 B. T. A. 780 (1926); Dudley v. Commissioner, 15
B. T. A. 570 (1929). On the other hand, although one may lawfully dispose of his property to escape taxation, it is said that the law will not uphold any mere manipulation, under the guise of disposition, the only effect
of which is to defeat a tax. Ransom v. City of Burlington, 111 Iowa 77,
82 N. W. 427 (1900); Mitchell v. Board of Commissioners, 91 U. S. 206,
23 L. ed. 302 (1875); James Duggan v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 608
.(1930). In Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 7th., 1931), it
is said "that tadng statutes cannot be intentionally circumvented by anticipatory arrangements and contracts is settled by the principle laid down
in Lucas v. Earle, 281 U. S.111, 74 L. ed. 731, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241 (1930)."
That case, however, simply held that a husband's income was taxable in its
en.tirety to him irrespective of a contract between him and his wife to the
effect that whatever either should receive should be received and earned by
both as joint tenants, Mr. Justice Holmes saying in the opinion: "There is
no doubt that the statute (REVEN'UE ACT oF 1918, c. 18, §§ 210, 212 (a),
213 (a) ) could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the
tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from investing even
a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us to be the import of
the statute before us . .

. ."

It cannot be doubted, however, that a com-

plete and final disposition of property made chiefly in order to avoid or
minimize a tax is valid. Compare the following cases to the effect that
where a bona fide gift is made even to a close relative, the proceeds from a
subsequent sale of the property are not taxable to the donor. Appeal of M.
J. Sullivan, 2 B. T. A. 1012 (1925); Appeal of Robert Jemison, Jr., supra
n. 14; Appeal of Frederick H. Hoffman, 3 B. T. A. 964 (1926); Appeal of
Martin Zinn, 3 B. T. A. 969 (1926); L. C. Moore v. Commissioner, 11 B. T.
A. 979 (1928); Hiatt v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1245 (1931); Smith v.
Commissioner (B. T. A., decided Jan. 21, 1932). See also Charles W. Wallworth v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 788 (1927) where an assignment of a
one-half interest in real estate to the taxpayer's wife prior to its sale in
order to minimize the resultant tax was held valid.
The legality (and
practice) of converting taxable income producing property into tax exempt
securities and of selling assets to establish a loss is too well known to re-

quire citation.
The gift or other disposition, however, must be real and not pretended

since the courts have repeatedly stated that where the admitted intent is
to avoid a tax, they will look through the form to the substance of the
transaction. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.189, 206, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920);
United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 168, 42 S.Ct. 63 (1921) ; Weiss v.
Stearn, 265 U. S. 242, 254, 44 S .Ct. 490 (1924); Goodyear Rubber Company v. United States, 273 U. S. 100, 103, 47 S. Ct. 263 (1927); Gulf Oil
Corporation v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S.71, 72, 39 S. Ct. 35 (1918); United States
v. Klausner, 25 F. (2d) 608, (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Brackett v. Commissioner,
19 B. T. A. 1154 (1930), aff'd. 57 F. (2d) 1072 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931);
Meurer Steel Barrel Co.,. Inc. v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A. 584 (1928),
aff'd. 35 F. (2d) 1019 (1929).
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6
and enjoy the benefit of the income upon which the tax is based."
On the other hand, a tax assessed against a corporation on profits
not retained by it but passing almost immediately to the stockholders to be taxed in their hands is, while logical if the transaction is conducted by the ordinary methods, an unfortunate interposition of the corporate entity resulting in a seemingly disproportionate share of such profits finding their way into the
coffers of the Treasury. If, however, the corporate shell can first
be broken and the profits be made to result from the act of the
stockholders, a single tax confined within reasonable limits is imposed upon those and only those from whom an income tax appears to be actually due.
A review of the cases indicates that there are in general three
plans or methods of liquidation which, when properly followed,
should result in the elimination of an income tax payable by the
corporation." These are (1) by distribution in kind of the assets to the stockholders and a subsequent sale by them; (2) by
purchase of the assets by the stockholders and resale by them;
and (3) by sale of the stock to the ultimate purchaser, who may
then distribute the assets to himself and dissolve the corporation.
But whatever method is adopted the difficulty may arise of convincing the Commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals or the
courts, as th case may be, that the transaction was not in substance a sale of assets by the corporation and the distribution by
it of the proceeds of the sale to the stockholders in exchange for
their stock. At least in so far as the Treasury is concerned (due
in part, doubtless, to the depressing effect of an unbalanced budget) the current tendency is to scrutinize such transactions closely and to resolve all doubts against the taxpayer who is admittedly endeavoring to avoid a tax. Nevertheless, the desired result

15A useful discussion as to when dividends are considered to be liquidating,
i. e., payments in exchange for stock, (and thus subject to both normal and
surtax) and when "going-concern"
dividends (subject on to surtax), is
contained in G. C. M. 8623, IX-2 Cum. Bull. 164.
"It has been recently decided that the transfer by a corporation of substantially all its properties for cash and notes of another corporation distributed in pursuance of a plan of "reorganization,"
is not a "tax free"
reorganization under sections 203 (b) (3), 203 (c) (1) and 203 (h) (1)
(A) of the Revenue Act of 1926. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 57 P. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); aff'd by U. S. Sup. Ct., U.
S. Daily, Jan. 10, 1933, at 1959; Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner,
60 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d. 1932). It follows that such'a transaction is
not a reorganization under sections 112 (b) (4), 112 (d) (1) and 112
(i) (1) (A) of the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932. But see § 112
(b) (5) of the 1932 Act and n. 70, infra.
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is not impossible of accomplishment since, as the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has aptly observed, income cannot
be created by fiat alone."7 Where the transaction is honestly and
carefully executed to the end that no income at any time is realized by the corporation, no tax liability can result.
Distribution in Kind and Sale by the Stockholders
The current revenue act provides that the term "gross income includes gains, profits and income derived from . . . sales
or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out
of the ownership or interest in such property.'
Gross income
of a corporation in liquidation is not specifically mentioned in
the statute but is treated in the Treasury Regulations in language
which is unmistakably clear to the effect that no such income is
realized from a distribution to stockholders of assets in kind although gain is recognized for income tax purposes from profitable transactions consummated by officers, trustees or receivers
on behalf of the corporation." As a starting point then we have
the Treasury very properly taking the official position that no
gain or loss is recognized to a corporation upon a distribution
by it to its stockholders of its assets in kind. As to the corporation, the transaction is purely a capital one.
As to the stockholders, recognizable gain or loss does, of course, result' depend17

Taplin v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 454 (1930).
"'REVENUE ACT op 1932, § 22 (a).
DU. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 71. The income tax regulations covering the
1932 Act have not een issued at this writing. Since there is no change in
the statute in this regard presumably art. 71 will be carried into the new
regulations unaltered. It is as follows: "Gross income of corporation in
liquidation.-When a corporation is dissolved, its affairs are usually wound
up by a receiver or trustees in dissolution. The corporate existence is continued for the purpose of liquidating the assets and paying the debts, and
such receiver or trustees stand in the stead of the corporation for such purposes. (See sections 274 and 298 and articles 1191 and 1192). Any sales
of property by them are to be treated as if made by the corporation for
the purpose of ascertaining the gain or loss. No gain or loss is realized by
a corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or
complete liquidation, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in
value since their acquisition." But see section 44 (d) and article 355. See
also article 392.
The sections of the Act and other articles of the Regulations referred to
in the above 'article pertain to bankruptcy, receiverships and installment
obligations and are not material to the topic herein considered.
This article is subsequently identical with U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 548;
U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 548; U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 548; and U. S.
Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 547, which was approved as a reasonable regulation by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Taylor Oil & Gas Co.
v. Commissioner, infra n. 33.
R 'VEzvmAcT OF 2932, sec, 115 (e).
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ing on the market value of the assets received as compared with
the cost or other basis to each stockholder of his stock, but this
is also true where the corporation converts its assets into cash at
a profit (and pays a tax) and distributes the money to the stockholders. Unless the practical difficulties are too great," it is to
the interest of the stockholders, therefore, first to distribute the
assets to themselves and then as individuals to consummate the
transaction which may have been originally negotiated on behalf
of the corporation. The result will be to increase the distributive
surplus by the amount of the corporation tax and the only perceivable disadvantage resulting is that the stockholders will have
received a greater profit upon which to pay their individual taxes,
that is to say, they will have lost the benefit of the corporate tax
as a deduction, which is hardly objectionable in view of the fact
that they have saved the tax itself.
At this point it might reasonably be asked whether this
method of liquidation does not present two taxable transactions,
the first being the receipt of the assets of the corporation by the
stockholders in exchange for their stock, and the second, the sale
by the stockholders of the assets thus received. The answer is
that there are two transactions in which gain or loss is recognizable, but that in the second no gain or loss occurs in fact, since
the fair market value of the assets when received by the stockholders from the corporation (and consequently, the basis for income tax purposes to them of such assets)' is neither more nor
less than the price received therefor from the purchaser. In other
words, the price immediately received is adopted by the Commissioner - as it must be - as the best evidence of the market
value of the assets in determining the extent of the profit realized
by the stockholders when the assets are distributed in kind to
them.' Consequently, no loss is sustained nor any gain realized
on the sale.
Distribution of corporate assets in kind among the stockholders of small corporations is by no means the difficult and complicated task that upon first glance it may appear to be. A change
of possession should not and does not appear to be required al2 The methods of- liquidating herein discussed - except, possibly, that
finally considered - would be impractical in the case of large corporations
with widely scattered stockholders. The great majority of corporations, however, are small and closely held.
REVENUE ACT OF 1932, § 113.

-G. C. M. 714, V-2 Cum. Bull. 72.
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though the right to immediate possession must, of course, pass to
the stockholders. The chief essential is clearly and unequivocally
to divest the corporation of title and to transfer such title to the
stockholders, individually, or to their agent or trustee to hold for
them in proportions equivalent to their ownership of stock If, as
a matter of substantive law, this purpose is effected, no profit can
accrue to the corporation upon the subsequent sale of the same
assets by the stockholders.'
The first case in the reports where such a transaction was
challenged by the Commissioner appears to be that of the Appeal
of Robert Jemison, Jr.,, decided by the Board of Tax Appeals on
2 This still appears to be the official position of the Commissioner, despite
a change in the official attitude as the result of some recent Board decisions
hereinafter considered. In G. C. M. 714, supra n. 23, the facts were that
pursuant to a contract entered into in 1924 between the M. Company stockholders and the 0 Company, the M Company was dissolved in that year,
the stockholders received the assets in kind by conveyance from the directors
as trustees in liquidation in 1925, and the assets were then sold and conveyed to the 0 Company. Held, there was a valid distribution in kind upon
dissolution, and no gain or loss was recognized with respect to the M Company. Taxable income was derived by the stockholders to the extent that
the amount received in liquidation exceeded the basis to them of their shares
of stock in the M Company.
Of course, the mere dissolution of a corporation does not effect a distribution of its assets among its stockholders, nor is such distribution effected simply by turning over the corporate assets to trustees in liquidation
who may also be stockholders. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v.
Blair, 26 F. (2d) 532 (App. D. C. 1928); Smith v. Commissioner (B. T. A.,
decided October 12, 1932). An actual transfer to the stockholders is essential.
2 3 B. T. A. 780. The facts are important as a typical example of the
method discussed above. There Jemison and one W. M. Leary, and their
respective wives, were the%sole stockholders of the Forest Park Realty Company, and had during the year 1919 successfully completed negotiations to
dispose of all the assets of the company for a price which would result in
a substantial profit and a heavy tax. 'With the admitted purpose of lessening the tax burden as far as possible legally and on the advice of counsel,
a meeting of the company's directors (consisting of Jemison, Leary and
their wives) was held on the 19th day of September, 1919, whereupon it was
resolved that the president be authorized and directed to effect a dissolution
of the company, and with the secretary to execute and deliver to the stockholders of the company a deed or deeds to all of the company's assets in
consideration of their assumption of all its liabilities, conveying such assets
to the various stockholders in proportion to their ownership of the company's capital stock. On the following day a meeting of the stockholders
was held, at which it was resolved that the company be dissolved, and accordingly, all of the stockholders present at the meeting signed and executed
an agreement of dissolution in accordance with the statutes of Alabama,
under which the corporation was organized. On September 22d deeds were
executed whereby the Forest Park Realty Company and its four stockholders,
signing as directors and trustees in dissolution, conveyed to themselves as
stockholders, first, the property included in the proposed sale, and second,
the balance of the property then owned by the company. On the same date
the stockholders conveyed the property included in the sale to the purchaser.

This deed was delivered on the 24th-and on that day the four former stock-
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February 17, 1926, where the stockholders as trustees in dissolution had conveyed the assets first to themselves in exchange for
their stock and on the same day, as individuals, sold the assets
to the purchaser with whom negotiations had been had prior to
the distribution. The case was heard by four members of the
Board, and the entire Board was unanimous in deciding that the
Commissioner erred in determining that a tax was assessable
against the corporation and that th6 stockholders had been
successful in limiting the profit on the transaction to themselves
and avoiding a profit and consequent tax to the corporation."
Similarly, in 1929 in the case of W. P. Fox & Sons 'v. Commissioner7 where the stockholders subscribed to stock in a new corporation to be formed and in payment therefor caused to be transferred to the new corporation all of the assets of the first company, the Board approved the transaction and found in favor of
the petitioner pointing out that no part of the consideration paid
for the transferred assets was received by the corporation. This
finding was made in the face of the fact that the original conipany did not first transfer its property to the stockholders but
conveyed them directly to the purchaser in order to avoid the
additional conveyance tax which would result from the transfer
of the same assets by the stockholders to the purchasing company.
Less than two months later, however, in the case of Taylor Oil &
Gas Company v. Commissioner the Board promulgated a decision
which has been widely cited as a precedent adverse to the taxpayer
in subsequent cases which have been before the Board and the
courts, and which has seemingly led to a change of attitude on
the part of Treasury officials.
In that case the stockholders in meeting assembled, after
first resolving that the corporation be dissolved, went on record
further as authorizing the board of directors to act as liquidating
trustees for the corporation and empowering such trustees in the
corporate name to sell and transfer all of the assets belonging to
the company. Subsequently, instruments were executed by the
holders received from the purchaser the agreed consideration for the sale
of the property, which was distributed among themselves in accordance with
their respective stock ownership in the corporation.
28A crude attempt to reach the same result where there was no actual
transfer to the stockholders and where the purchase price was paid to the
corporation instead of to the stockholders was rejected by the Board two
years later. Southern Ice & Fuel Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1913

(1928).
n 15 B. T. A. 115.
215 B, T, A, 609 (1929).
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directors, as trustees, conveying the properties "belonging to said
Taylor Oil & Gas Company" to the purchaser with whom negotiations had been had by the corporate officers prior to the stockholders' meeting. The company was incorporated under the laws
of Texas, which provided that upon the dissolution of a corporation, its president and board of directors should be trustees for the
creditors and stockholders of the company with full power to
settle its affairs and in the name of the corporation to sell, convey and transfer all of the real and personal property belonging
to such company.? The Board held that the conveyance was in
fact made by the corporation and the resulting profit taxable to
it because the directors were trustees for the corporation and not
for the stockholders. The decision seems justified and is clearly
distinguishable on its facts from the Jemison case and from G.
0. M. 714' since there was no actual preliminary distribution in kind to the stockholders or to trustees for them."
The Taylor case was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit,' which, after pointing out that the contract
of sale was for all practical purposes consummated by the corporation before the resolution authorizing the distribution to the
trustees, and was thus enforceable against the corporation, unnecessarily and with unforeseen results proceeded to declare in
general terms that title to the assets remained in the company until such time as its affairs were liquidated and its debts paid."
3TEx. REV. CIv CODE (Vernon, 1925) art. 1206. The West Virginia statute
is generally similar. W. VA. REv. CODE, (1931), c. 31, art. 1, § 83.
uSupra n. 25.
nSupra n. 23.
n In addition to the fact that the stockholders authorized the board of
directors to act as trustees for the corporation and the fact that property
"belonging to the corporation" was conveyed by such-trustees to the purchaser, the income from the corporate properties from the date of the tentative closing of the negotiations to the date of actual transfer was set out
on the books of the selling company in a special account in favor of the
purchaser indicating clearly that at no time did the "beneficial ownership"
of the assets pass to the stockholders.
"1Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 5th,
1931).
" 'It may be doubted that the contract of sale was merely executory. Except for executing the formal deed, there was nothing to be done.
The
price, the thing, and the effective time of delivery, December 15, 1919. had
been agreed upon. But, if it was executory,-it was still the contract of the
company to be executed before there could be any liquidation of its affairs.
Conceding for the purpose of argument that the legal title to the property
vested in the trustees by the dissolution, no part of the title passed to the
stockholders thereby. The real owner was still the company until such time
as its affairs were liquidated, the debts paid, and the residue distributed to
the stockholders." Id. at 109.
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While the Taylor case was pending on appeal the Board considered and passed upon two generally similar cases without departing from the principles laid down in the Jemison decision.'
However, in the case of Fred A. Helebushi v. Commissioner ' the
Board unexplainably took a stand which has rendered its present
attitude in cases of this kind extremely uncertain. A summary of
the facts of this case - which held, in effect, that an unrestricted
transfer of assets by a corporation to trustees for its stockholders
to be sold by them to the purchaser was, in effect, a transfer to
its own trustees because the trust had been created by a corporate
act and the debts had not first been paid - is set forth in a footnote.' The view of the majority of the Board can be fairly criticized on several grounds. In the first place, the dictum of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Taylor case, intended, it is believed, to apply to the facts of that case alone, was accepted by
"James Duggan v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 608 (1930) (involving a
rather badly bungled attempt by a corporation to distribute its assets in
kind to its stockholders preliminary to liquidation with one hand, while
closely retaining them for its own purposes with the other, decided adversely
to the taxpayer); Lexington Ice & Coal Company v. Commissioner, 23 B. T.
A. 463 (1931) (where the Board approved a distribution of assets in kind
to an agent for stockholders to be immediately sold on their behalf even
where the consideration for the property was paid by the purchaser to the
selling corporation and deposited and paid out by checks in its name).
Reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, January
10, 1933, on the authority of Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, supra
n. 33.
"24 B. T. A. 660 (1931).
'There the stockholders (whose counsel had obviously made a careful
study of the mistakes in a similar transaction attempted by Taylor Oil &
Gas Company) after negotiating informally for a sale of the company's
assets to a third party, held a special meeting at which it was resolved that
the company be dissolved and liquidated, and that all of its assets be transferred to two of its officers as trustees for the stockholders of the company,
with power to sell and distribute the proceeds among the beneficiaries of the
trust. On the same day the officers of the corporation executed formal conveyances to the trustees of all of the company's assets.
Following these
conveyances the trustees entered into a contract with the purchaser. On the
same day the trustees, designating themselves as trustees for the stockholders of the selling company, by deed and bill of sale transferred the real
and personal property, formerly owned by the corporation, to the purchaser
and received as trustees the consideration which, after deducting expenses
and debts, was distributed to the former stockholders, the beneficiaries of
the trust. It will be observed that the corporation irrevocably transferred
title to its assets to the stockholders prior to the sale, and that it received
no -part of the purchase price upon the sale by the stockholders to the ultimate purchaser. Nevertheless, the Board with three dissenting members,
found in favor of the Commissioner, stating that they felt themselves to be
controlled by the decision in the Taylor Oil & Gas Company case despite
a very apparent difference in the facts of the two cases. An attempt was
made to base the decision on the fact that the corporation was the creator
of the trust and must, therefore, be its beneficiary. The transfer in trust
"being the act of the corporation, the trustee would necessarily be responsi-
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the Board as a general rule of law which it apparently felt obliged
to follow. In the second place, it is indefensible to base a decision on the assumption that the creator of a trust ipso facto becomes its beneficiary despite a clearly expressed intent to the contrary. Finally, no reason is perceived why an irrevocable transfer by a corporation to its stockholders or their trustees is not
valid for all purposes if the transferees assume the payment of
the debts of the transferor or such payment is otherwise provided
for as by the sale of other assets. "It must be recognized", said
Board lMember Goodrich in his dissenting opinion, "that there are
legal and proper methods by which the accrual of a tax liability
upon the disposition of its assets by a corporation may be avoided.
Attempts to adopt such devices must be adjudged strictly upon
the facts in each case. I think the facts in this case disclose that
petitioners successfully availed themselves of such a method
The case is now on appeal in the Sixth Circuit and if the
Board is affirmed it is to be hoped that the Court will throw some
much needed light on the perplexing situation which has arisen
since the case was decided, and will not rest its decision on strained and dubious applications of the law of trusts and corporations. '
The language of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Taylor case, which the Board apparently took to mean that there
can be no distribution of assets to stockholders prior to liquidation and the payment of debts, has been measurably clarified by
a recent decision of the same Court.' There, the corporation by
ble to and acting for the creator of the trust, even though the stockholders
were beneficially interested in the property. The trust was closed when the
property was sold, the debts owing the corporation collected, the debts of
the corporation paid, and the money distributed to the stockholders.
It
was then that the stockholders came into the possession of the proceeds of
the property."
I In the past few months the Board has decided two cases adversely to
the taxpayers but with ample justification and upon facts clearly distinguishable from the Jemison and Heflebush cases, namely, Nibley-Mimaugh
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner (B. T. A., decided September 13, 1932), and
Boggs, Burnam & Co. v. Commissioner (B. T. A. decided September 15,
1932). The first case turned principally on the fact that there was no valid
transfer of the assets from the corporation to the trustee for the stockholders, but on the contrary the corporation was a party to the instruments
which conveyed title to the purchaser. In the second, there was no change
in the beneficial ownership of the corporate assets inasmuch as the authorizing resolution provided that the corporation retain possession pending the
sale by the stockholders, and that they be reconveyed by the stockholders
in the event such sale was not consummated.
wSnead v. Elmore, 59 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
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its deed conveyed all of its assets to the stockholders in consideration of the surrender of their stock and their assumption of the
corporate liabilities, and the stockholders (who composed a partnership) set up the distributable surplus on the partnership books,
dissolved the corporation, and operated the former corporate property for a period of two years when it was sold for cash at a
profit equal to the surplus originally set up on the books of the
partners. In this case the position of the parties was reversed,
the stockholders contending that the profit received by them from
the assets of the corporation was income in 1920 when sold for
cash and not in 1918 when the distribution was made by the corporation. They maintained - as the Commissioner maintained
in the Taylor Oil & Gas Company case and the Helebush
case' - that under the local statute the assets continued vested
in the directors as trustees for the corporation after the dissolution until sold for cash in the year 1920. In reversing the District Court which had found in favor of the stockholders, the
Circuit Court in an opinion by Judge Sibley, correctly reasoned
that since prior to dissolution the corporation had transferred its
properties to the stockholders in exchange for their stock and their
assumption of the corporate debts, it had no assets to vest in trust
in its directors.
Until further enlightenment is had from the appellate courts
there will be a degree of uncertainty as to the methods by
which the indirect sale may be successfully consummated, and it
is possible that the restrictions imposed upon distributions of assets in kind will be so onerous as to render them impractical for
the purpose of avoiding the double tax. At this writing it still
appears that the stockholders of a corporation may without great
inconvenience avoid an income tax against the corporation upon
the sale of the corporate assets by an intermediate transfer of
such assets to themselves, and it is believed that this right will be
sustained in the final clarification of the law in this regard. Each
step, however, must be complete in itself and the distribution
must be real and not fancied. It is immaterial that the avowed
intention of the transaction is to minimize taxes, and it is not
fatal or improper that negotiations with the purchaser have
been had, and the terms of the sale tentatively agreed upon, prior
to the distribution to the stockholders, providing nothing in the na'0Supra n. 28.

41Supre.n. 37.
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ture of a contract has been entered into between the officers of
the corporation and the purchaser.
The following suggestions, however, might well be borne in
mind: (a) It is better that the authorizing resolution direct the
officers of the corporation to transfer the assets directly to the
stockholders and not to an agent or trustee for them. The stockholders may then for convenience create a trust for their benefit.
(b) There must be an actual and irrevocable conveyance from the
corporation to the stockholders. Furthermore, it must be clear
that the corporation intends to distribute its assets in kind to the
stockholders irrespective of the sale by them to the purchaser.
The first step must not be contingent upon the second.' (c) The
capital stock should be surrendered by the stockholders upon receipt of title to the assets and cancelled by the corporation."
(d) Formal dissolution of the corporation before the transfer of
the assets to the stockholders is unnecessary" and may, or may
not be subsequently effected, depending on whether there is any
reason for keeping the corporate existence intact as in the case
42 On principle, it should be possible to make an effective distribution to
a trustee but unless the Hellebush decision is reversed, the present state of
the law seems to require the more inconvenient method of a transfer direct
to 43the stockholders.
Nibley-nimnaugh Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 38; James Duggan v.
Commissioner, supra n. 14.
"Boggs, Burnam & Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 38.
In the usual case all of the assets are sold or distributed and the corporation is, at approximately the same time, dissolved. But frequently, as
under the West Virginia Statute, W. VA. REv. CODE (1931), c. 31, art. 1, § 83,
certain formalities must be complied with before the certificate of dissolution is issued and the authorities seem fairly uniform to the effect that actual
dissolution does not take place until the consent of the State thereto Is
manifested. 8 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1919) § 5449.
Whether or not dissolution is a prerequisite to a valid distribution of all
of the corporate assets is fundamentally a question of the law of the state
under which the corporation is organized. The West Virginia dissolution
statute is clear to the effect that "no. division of the assets among the
stockholders shall be made until .. . . notice of the resolution of dissolution
shall have been published once a week for at least two successive weeks in
some newspaper published or of general circulation in the county in which
the principal office or place of business of the corporation is located."
The
statute does not seem, however, to require that the certificate of dissolution
be issued before the assets may be divided. On the other hand, it is elsewhere provided in the CODE (c. 31, art. 1, § 64) that "every corporation
existing under the laws of this State, may . . . . sell, lease, or exchange all of its property and assets, including its good will and its corporate franchises, upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, ....
as its board of directors shall deem expedient and for the best
interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by the affirmative vote
of the holders of sixty per cent. of the stock . . ."
If a distribution of
assets in kind to stockholders who thereupon surrender their stock is an exchange within the meaning of this section, the corporation presumably may
distribute its assets without the necessity of dissolution. A sale or dis-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss2/3

14

118

Altizer: Minimizing Federal Income Taxes upon the Sale of Corporate Assets
MINIMIZING FEDERAL INCOME TAXES

where all of the assets are not distributed or sold, and all of the
(e) There must be a change in the
stock is not surrendered.
beneficial ownership of the property from the corporation to the
stockholders.' It has been pointed out that a change in possession is not essential, but as one of the incidents of absolute title
the right of immediate possession must pass to the stockholders.
Any income which was earned during the period intervening between the distribution and the sale must be received by or impounded for the stockholders who may, if they wish, subsequently
assign the same to the purchaser." (f) The corporation must, of
course, not be a party to the conveyance of the assets from the
stockholders, or their trustee, to the purchaser." (g) The consideration for the sale must be paid to the stockholders, or their
representative, and not to the corporation.' Where the purchase
price is paid to the stockholders, there is no justification for holding that it is constructively received by the corporation,' but it
is clearly not alone sufficient that the stockholders receive the
consideration where there is no actual transfer to them of the assets prior to the sale.' (h) According to the better view it is not
essential that the debts of the corporation be paid prior to the
distribution, providing they are assumed by the stockholders,"
unless this is required by the local law' or insisted upon by the
creditors. (i) The corporation and the purchaser must not have
entered into any enforceable sales agreement prior to the distribution to the stockholders."
tribution of all the corporate assets does not in itself act to dissolve the
corporation. Weigand v. Alliance Supply Co., 44 W. Va. 133, 28 S. E. 803
(1897); 8 FLETCHiE, CoPon.AoNs (1919) § 5438. In any event, a corporation
may make a partial distribution to stockholders - subject always to the
rights of creditors - and remain in existence.
"Duggan v. Commissioner, supra n. 14; Warden v. Commissioner, 23 13.
T. A. 24 (1931); Boggs, Burnam & Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 38.
C70f. Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 28.
"Nibley-Mimnaugh Co. v. Commissioner, &upran. 38; Warden v. Commissioner, supra n. 46.

Ice & Fuel Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 26.
10W. P. Fox & Sons v. Commissioner, supra n. 27.
"Warden v. Commissioner, supra n. 46.
Snead v. Elmore, supra n. 39. Contra Hellebush v. Commissioner, smpra
n. 37; Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 33 (dictum).
"The West Virginia statute requires the payment of all corporate debts
and liabilities prior to a division of assets among the stockholders upon disolution. W. VA. REv. CODE (1931), c. 31, art. 1, § 80. But if the corporation is
not dissolved and an exchange is made of assets for stock under section 68,
it would seem that only creditors could demand that the debts be first
4"Southern

paid.

"Taylor

Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 33.
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Sale to the Stockholders and Resale by Them
An easier but seemingly less justifiable method of avoiding
the corporate tax has been successfully accomplished by a sale
of the assets at cost or book value to the stockholders who immediately resell them to the ultimate purchaser and realize a
profit individually. Under these circumstances there is no corporate distribution in kind but there is a similar saving in the
corporate tax. The corporation admittedly disposes of its assets
to third parties (the stockholders in a different role), but at little
or no profit. The stockholders resell their assets at a profit and
pay the normal and surtax, or the twelve and one-half per cent.
capital net gain rate, as in the case of liquidating dividends. The
corporation tax is avoided or at least substantially reduced. The
corporation may then dissolve and return to the stockholders as a
liquidating dividend the money paid by them for the assets.
The advantage of this method over the other lies in its simplicity.
The disadvantage results from the difficulty of showing that the
sale to the stockholders was a bona fide transaction.
In the case of Iowa Bridge Company v. Commissioner" the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
Board of Tax Appeals and held that an assignment by a corporation of certain valuable contracts to its sole stockholder in consideration of his execution of the contracts and his relieving the
corporation of liability with respect thereto was valid, and that
the profit accruing upon the completion of the contracts was income to the stockholder and not to the corporation despite the
fact that there was no formal assignment other than a resolution
of the stockholders and no notice of such assignment was given
to the obligees. Moreover, as the petitioner admitted, the obvious
c3U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 51, provides that "where property is sold
by a corporation to a shareholder, or by an employer to an employee, for an
amount substantially less than its fair market value, such shareholder of
the corporation or such employee shall include in gross income the difference
between the amount paid for the property and the amount of its fair market value. In computing the gain or loss from the subsequent sale of such
property its cost shall be deemed to be its fair market value at the date of
acquisition by the shareholder or the employee."
Similar language is contained in Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 31 and Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 31 and T. D.
3435, I-1 Cum. Bull. 50. This regulation has, however, been practically
nullified in cases where there is an actual sale, by recent decisions of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals to thie effect that it is not warranted by the
statutes. See Taplin v. Commissioner, supra n. 17, and Commissioner v. Van
Vorst, 59 1. (2d) 677 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
39 F. (2d) 777 (1930).
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purpose of the transaction was to minimize income taxes."' Subsequently, in 1931 the Board decided the case of Fruit Belt Telephone Company v. Commissionere where an even more transparent device was presented for its consideration.
In that case
negotiations had been had looking to the purchase by the Southern
Bell Telephone Company of the Fruit Belt Company, and with such
purpose in mind the Southern Company had made an appraisal of
the Fruit Belt Company's assets. In completing the sale the two
stockholders of the selling corporation avoided a substantial corporate tax by the simple expedient of purchasing the assets from
the corporation for $32,000.00 cash (about $5,000.00 in excess of
book value), and on the same day reselling the same property to
the Southern Company for $55,000.00. After the sale the Fruit
Belt Company dissolved and returned to the stockholders as a
liquidating dividend cash in the amount of the purchase price of
the assets theretofore rec'eived from them. The corporation reported as income in its return the difference between the cost of
the assets and the consideration therefor received from its stockholders on the sale to them, and the stockholders each reported as
profit one-half of the difference between $32,000.00 and $55,000.00.
The Commissioner proposed a deficiency assessment against the corporation which was reversed by the Board which observed, "So
long as neither creditor nor stockholder has any objection to the
sale of assets by a corporation, clearly, a corporation is not prohibited by law from selling to its stockholders even at a price
less than the value of the assets .

. . ."

In other cases, however,"'

similar sales have been disregarded for lack of bona fides and in
the very recent case of S. A. MacQueen Company v. Commissioner a closely similar transaction was disapproved by the Board.
1 Similarly, in Savannah Ship Chandlery & Supply Co. v. Commissioner,
13 B. T. A. 958 (1928), where the president of the petitioner corporation
purchased ships from the corporation at one price, sold them at a higher,
and divided the profit with the other stockholders in proportion to their
ownership of the stock, the Commissioner's attempt to assess the corporation
with a tax on the profit resulting from the second sale was overruled. But
in Rubay Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 133 (1927), and Rasmussen v.
Eddy's Steam Bakery, 57 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) sales by corporations to'their largest stockholders were held to be ineffective for income tax

purposes.
"Supra n. 13.
9Supra n. 57.
mB. T. A., decided October 24, 1932. There the stockholders resolved
that the board of directors be authorized and directed to sell to MacQueen
(the company's president and largest stockholder) certain real estate owned
by the company for such price as the board might deem expedient. On the
same day the board resolved that the property be sold to MacQueen for
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It is not altogether surprising that the Commissioner has
been sometimes successful in challenging a sale of corporate assets to stockholders at a price substantially less than their demonstrated market value. Since the stockholders absolutely control
the corporation there is force in the suggestion that there may
be no bona fide, arms length transaction between them.
The
stockholders may fix the purchase price at any sum that suits
their convenience.'
Moreover, while the Fruit Belt Telephone
Company case has been expressly distinguished on doubtful
grounds from later cases, it is questionable whether it was not
tacitly overruled by the decision in MacQuden Company v. Comniissioner. For these reasons the sale to the stockholders at a
price below market value and a resale by them cannot be safely
recommended as a method of avoiding the double tax on the sale
of corporate assets. Such a transaction is too apt to be held to
be, in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "on the wrong side of
the line indicated by the policy if not the mere letter of the
law.'
However, if such an attempt is made, it is desirable (a)
that the sale be made to the stockholders for a consideration which
$85,000.00 and that the proper officers be authorized to deliver a deed upon
receipt of the stated consideration. The following day MacQueen entered
into a contract to sell the same real estate to one Hatfield for $150,000.00.
Nine days later MacQueen executed an instrument reciting that he held the
difference between $85,000.00 and $150,000.00 in trust for the stockholders
of the S. A. MacQueen Company. Approximately three weeks later MacQueen paid the company $65,000.00 and received a deed to the property, and
on the same day conveyed the property to Hatfield for $150,000.00 cash,
and thereafter divided among himself and the other stockholders the excess
of $65,000.00 received from Hatfield. The Board held that the sale to MacQueen was not bona fide and that the profit on the sale to Hatfield was
taxable to the corporation, principally on the ground that MacQueen was
the president and largest stockholder and that he received the profits on the
sale as trustee for the corporation.
"For cases where the Courts and the Board have disregarded the corporate
entity in transactions with stockholders see Appeal of M. I. Stewart & Co.,
2 B. T. A. 737 (1925); Hollenberg Music Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A.
421 (1927); Clahcy & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 855 (1928);
Rubay Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 57; Rasmussen v. Eddy's Steam Bakery, supra n. 57; S. A. MacQueen Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 60. For
cases contra (in addition to those discussed above) see Burnet, Commissioner v. Commonwealth Improvement Co. (Sup. Ct. of U. S., decided December
12, 1932); Burnet, Commissioner v. Clark, (U. S. Sup. Ct., decided December
12, 1932); McDonald v. Commissioner, 52 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 4th,
1931); Strand Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B. T. A. 770 (1926);
Gem Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 309 (1927); Becker v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 65 (1927); Rogers v. Commissioner, 12 B. T.
A. 816 (1928); Brown Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A.
609 (1928); 112 West 59th Street Corporation v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A.
767 (1931); Gregory v. Commissioner (B. T. A., decided December 6, 1932).
"Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra p, 12,
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will reflect at least some profit to the corporation;' (b) that the
sale be made direct to the stockholders and not to a trustee or,
if the stockholders are very numerous, or if for other reasons a
conveyance to representatives is unavoidable, such representa.
tives be in no event officers or directors of the company;"I (c)
there must be a change in the beneficial ownership of the assets
and the income, if any, accruing therefrom, which includes the
right to immediate possession;' (d) it must be made clear that
the stockholders in receiving title to the assets and subsequently
selling the same are not acting for the corporation;' and (e) the
sale to the stockholders must be irrevocable, complete and made
in good faith in the sense that it must be real and not pretended,
and if this is the case the transaction will not be invalidated
merely because the principal object of the parties was to minimize
taxes.' Dissolution of the corporation either before or after the
sale is unnecessary,' and it seems clear that the debts need not
first be paid.'
Sale of the Stock
Providing a purchaser of all the corporate assets is found the
simplest and surest method of minimizing income taxes on the
sale is by assignment of the stock to the purchaser who, upon assuming complete control of the corporation may cause its dissolution and acquire its assets through liquidation. The difficulty
with this method is that it is generally unattractive to the purchaser unless he has some reason for keeping the selling corporation alive. If his object is only to acquire the assets,
he is apt to be unwilling to assume the burden and expense of
liquidation. Then, too, he may with good reason be reluctant to
run the risk of hitherto unasserted claims against the corporation
13 This is not essential but as a practical matter may result in securing the
Commissioner's approval of the transaction, thus avoiding litigation.
01S. A. MacQueen Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 60.
The general rule
that officers or directors receive secret profits as trustees for the corporation
is followed in West Virginia. See Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va.
364, 158 S. E. 678 (1931); Petrelli Coal Co. v. Petrelli, 99 W. Va. 72, 127
S. E. 915 (1925); Nickel Plate Land Co. v. Broom, 96 W. Va. 586, 123 S.
E. 594 (1924); North American Coal, etc., Co. v. O'Neal, 82 W. Va. 186, 95
S. E. 822 (1918).
05S. A. MacQueen Co. v. Commissioner, upra n. 60.
8 Rasmussen v. Eddy's Steam Bakery, supra n. 57.
OTIowa Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 56; Fruit Belt Telephone Co.
v. Commissioner, supra n. 58.
0
Supra n. 45.
Supra n. 45, n. 52 and n. 53.
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or a possible discrepancy between the net worth of the assets as
represented and as may uiltimately prove to be a fact. However,
in the event that a purchaser is found who is content to take over
the corporation intact by the purchase of its stock, such a transaction will avoid a double tax since no tax will be
payable by the corporation and the stockholders are taxable only on the profit represented by the difference between the
cost or other basis to them of their stock and the amount received
therefor.'
It is important, however, that all papers and records incidental to the sale make it clear that what is sold is actually the
stock and not the corporate assets, for while the courts and the
Board have laid emphasis on the fact that the true test is whether
there is a change of ownership in the stock, confusion has occasionally arisen from the manner in which the sale was executed.
The common mistake is to make the records so ambiguous that
either a stock sale or a sale of assets might have occurred.'
Nevertheless, a liberal attitude in cases of this nature has been
adopted by the Board which has held the transaction to be a
stock sale although the sales agreement provided for a sale of
assets and stock, and the stock certificates were returned to the
selling stockholders shortly after the acquisition of the assets of
the selling corporation by the purchaser.' The Board emphasized
the fact that there was a change in the ownership of the stock,
which was worthless when returned to the sellers. Similarly, in
Patterson v. Motter' a District Court of Kansas held the transaction there involvdd to be a sale of the corporation's stock by
its stockholders and not a sale of assets taxable to the corporation,
although the contract of sale provided in the alternative for a
transfer of stock or assets on the election of the purchaser, since
the corporation was never a party to any sales agreement and was
not bound by an agreement of the stockholders which was never
executed. But in another case the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit determined the transaction to be a sale of asIf instead of receiving cash the stock is exchanged in pursuance of a
plan of reorganization as defined by the Act solely for stock or securities
of another corporation a party to the reorganization, the transaction may be
entirely exempt from tax. See REvENuE ACT or 1932, §§ 112 (a) (3) and
112 (i) (1) (2); U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Arts. 574, 575 and 577; Hendricks,
Federal Income Tax: Definition of "Beorganzation" (1932) 45 H&Rv. L.
REv. 648.
U. S. v. Board, 14 F. (2d) 459 (1926).
Reisner Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 841 (1928).
'a55 F. (2d) 692 (D. Kan. 1931).
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sets, although nominally a stock sale, where the stockholders of
the selling corporation, after endorsing their stock certificates to
the purchaser, continued to act as stockholders in dissolving the
selling corporation."
In Dudley v. Commissioner' the Board found that what occurred was a stock sale despite the fact that a preliminary option agreement stipulated for the formation of a new company
and the purchase of the selling company's assets by it, and although the minutes of the company thus formed recorded a resolution authorizing the purchase of assets. The Board based its
decision on the fact that the selling company was not a party to
such negotiations (the option agreement having been entered into
between the purchaser and the selling company's stockholders),
and that the purchase money was paid directly to the stockholders and not to the selling company.
In two recent cases the Board has been called upon to determine whether or not the acquisition of all of the assets of one
bank by another was a sale of stock or a sale of assets and taxable to the selling bank. In the first' an offer was made to purchase stock at $40.00 a share, but the minutes of the meetings incident to the transaction and the instruments transferring title
referred to a sale of assets. It was held that the transaction
amounted to a sale of assets and the assessment proposed
by the Commissioner against the selling corporation was sustained although the stock certificates had been subsequently surrendered by the selling stockholders to the former president of
their corporation, who had since become a vice-president of the
purchasing corporation, and was to some extent at least acting for
it. In the other case " an agreement was entered into between the
two banks, whereby the purchaser agreed to buy the seller's 1,000
shares of outstanding stock at $400.00 a share. Thereafter, the
president of the selling company acquired options on the stock
of his company and subsequently transferred the same
to a representative of the purchaser.
The purchaser
immediately secured the election of a new board of directors, and, through proper corporate action, the transfer of the
The selling
assets of the selling corporation to the purchaser.
7 U. S. v. Ejausner, 25 F. (2d) 608 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
15 B. T. A. 570 (1929). The Commissioner has acquiesced in this decision. VII-2 Cum. Bull. 15.
"Brady v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 596 (1931).
Stock Yards Bank of Cincinnati v, Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. (decided
March 23, 1932).
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corporation was thereupon dissolved. It was argued on behalf
of the Commissioner that under the laws of Illinois a savings bank
was prohibited from investing in the stock of another bank and
that, therefore, the transaction must have been a sale of assets.
The Board, however, refused to follow this view pointing out that
the sale had been approved by the State commissioner of banking, and determined that the true nature of the transaction was a
purchase of stock and subsequent liquidation by the purchasing
stockholder.
A substantial tax saving may result from a sale of the stock
rather than the assets but it is apparent from the foregoing that
care must be exercised in managing the details of the sale. The
following features of the transaction should be closely observed:
(a) There must be an actual change in the ownership of the stock
and a transfer of the certificates. 8
(b) The instruments and
records pertaining to the sale should make it clear that the subject of the sale is stock in a corporation and not the corporate
assets.
(c) The consideration must be paid directly to the stockholders and not to the corporation, nor to a liquidating agent for
the corporation.'
The stockholders of the selling corporation
must not continue to act as such in order to dissolve the
corporation, or for any other purpose.'
(e) No action must be
taken to lessen the value of the stock prior to the transfer of the
stock by the distribution to the purchaser of assets of the selling
corporation.'
(f) The corporation must not be a party to any
preliminary option agreement, contract of sale, or other instrument pertaining to the transaction.8
,onclusion
Under the present state of the law and condition of the
Treasury any plan to minimize the taxes imposed upon a profitable sale of corporate assets, however skillfully designed and
carefully executed, may be rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is not only expected but demanded of conscientious officials that they assess the tax in any case where they
entertain an honest doubt as to the effectiveness of the method
8 Reisner Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, supra n. 72.
v. Commissioner, supra n. 76.

70 Brady

n1U. S. v. Klausner, supra n. 74.

"3PattersQn v, Motter, supra n, 73,
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employed to avoid it. Fortunately for the tax-payer, there exist
the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts which may generally
be relied upon to safeguard such rights and remedies as he possesses under the taxing statutes. The exact scope of his ability
to avoid legally the double tax on the sale of corporate assets has
yet to be determined.' An attempt has been made to sketch its
probable .extent, to define its limitations, and to point out the
mistakes of those who have been unsuccessful in their efforts.
But if taxes are as certain as death, the law of taxation is
as uncertain as life, and whether the suggestions herein contained
will be finally approved must, for the time being at least, remain
somewhat conjectural.
. ' The Supreme Court of the United States denied an application for a
writ of certiorari in the case of Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, supra
3. 33, on June 1, 1931, 283 U. S. 862, 51 S. Ct. 655.
On no other occasion,
apparently, has this question been considered by that Court.
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